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set forth his own view of the "center" without giving equal space to others. An 
article which sets forth differing views should not be written by a person who 
represents one of these views. Or  if the author is a protagonist for one of the 
views under discussion, he or she should at least avoid setting forth hidher own 
view as unquestionably the best. 
In light of the editors' remarks in the preface, it is difficult to understand 
how P. W. Barnett could write his article on the "Opponents of Paul" without 
any reference to Sanders's view. Sanders is neither mentioned in the article nor 
listed in the bibliography. Whether Sanders is correct or not is not the issue. 
There is nothing wrong with Barnett's view that most of Paul's opponents were 
Judaizers, but at least he should state why he takes this position in light of 
Sanders's challenge to this view. 
The cross-referencing of all the articles is a welcome feature that 
considerably heightens the volume's usefulness. The work also includes a 
Pauline letter index, a subject index, and an article index. On  format, it would 
have been much easier to locate the end of each article if the word 
BIBLIOGRAPHY had been   laced in bold print with space between it and the 
cross references. A few typographical errors were noted. The word "human" is 
repeated (877, col. 2, para. I), and "Moreover" (673) and "condemns" (942) are 
misspelled. 
Especially because of the timeliness of the volume it will serve as a handy 
reference to check where evangelicals stand with regard to recent Pauline 
studies. It also saves time to be able to go to just one source on Paul to find the 
most up-to-date information. 
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This book is, in the words of Ted Honderich, Grote Professor of Mind 
and Logic at University College, London, "a kind of precis" of his 644-page A 
Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience, and Life-Hopes. The first six 
chapters examine two of the rival theories that explain human behavior as either 
a result of cause and effect or originated by free will. The final four chapters 
explore the implications of the position he himself holds, that of determinism. 
An extensive glossary defines the terms. 
Honderich's concept of determinism is that human behavior is the product 
of biochemical and neurological activity within the human brain. Although he 
does not say it explicitly, he seems to view free will as a free-floating conscious- 
ness at least partially independent of neurological activity. That is, the human 
mind can make decisions and initiate actions undetermined and not limited by 
the structure, stored data, and neurological activity of the nervous system. 
Honderich approaches the determinism/free will controversy strictly from 
a philosophical perspective. Although he may in his larger work touch upon the 
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growing body of data on how the nervous system works at a biochemical and 
structural level to produce what we call the mind, here he makes only passing 
reference to the scientific findings. However, brain studies demonstrate the 
intricate relationship between thought and all other conscious activity and thus 
support his position that human behavior and thought are a consequence of 
cause and effect. 
Although Honderich argues from a determinist perspective, that does not 
mean that he believes that we are nothing more than preprograrnrned machines. 
He feels that determinism can and does go together with voluntary behavior 
(86). "It does not at all follow from determinism that man does not really know 
what he is doing or is compelled to do a thing" (89). Thus while our behavior 
is a result or product of what is in our brain, we do have real (though 
necessarily limited, of course) control over that behavior and a real range of 
options as to how we can respond to that causation. 
The author sees the question of determinism as affecting four things: life 
hopes, personal feelings, knowledge, and moral responsibility. His final chapter 
concentrates on an aspect of the fourth category, that of punishment and its 
relationship to determinism and moral responsibility. 
The author believes that while acknowledging that the kind of 
determinism he is arguing for does require us to give up certain kinds of hopes 
and possibilities, it can also have positive benefits. If we recognize that we 
cannot really have or do something, we will stop wasting time and effort in 
seeking it, time and effort that can be channeled into what we actually can get 
or accomplish. Thus we can still have a "celebratorym life (118). 
While Honderich grants that most people do not really believe in 
determinism, he argues that only "true belief' in it will enable us really to 
succeed in "affirming" life. Otherwise we are doomed to frustration as we seek 
to do the impossible. 
Against Honderich's thesis, modern science is increasingly showing the 
weakness of the philosophical concept of a free-floating free will and at the same 
time undermining the related theological concept of a soul independent of the 
body. All human mental activity has an inseparable neurological activity, 
leaving no room for a will or self independent of the mind-body unity. While 
we are products of cause and effect, these factors are so complex that we do not 
run on autopilot but can really decide within the parameters of the cause-and- 
effect correlation. One would like to see Honderich or someone else explore the 
ramifications of this very complexity of causation on decision-making behavior. 
Theology needs to take into account the kind of determinism Honderich 
presents. For example, what could theology tell us about the role of the Holy 
Spirit in overcoming deterministic causation? When the Apostle Paul laments 
his spiritual struggles in Romans 7, could the cause-and-effect role of the mind- 
body unit help us to see more clearly both the limitations of human will and 
the necessity for the Holy Spirit to be active in salvation? And how do the 
conditions of the body itself, the world around it, and past life experiences 
affect the response to the Spirit? 
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